Abstract-Canetti, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali (STOC 2000) introduced the notion of resettable zero-knowledge proofs, where the protocol must be zero-knowledge even if a cheating verifier can reset the prover and have several interactions in which the prover uses the same random tape. Soon afterwards, Barak, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Lindell (FOCS 2001) studied the closely related notion of resettable soundness, where the soundness condition of the protocol must hold even if the cheating prover can reset the verifier to have multiple interactions with the same verifier's random tape. The main problem left open by this work was whether it is possible to have a single protocol that is simultaneously resettable zero knowledge and resettably sound. We resolve this question by constructing such a protocol.
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental question in cryptography deals with understanding the role that randomness plays in cryptographic protocols and to what extent it is necessary. Progress on this question was made relatively early with the result of Goldreich and Oren [13] showing that zero knowledge protocols cannot exist in the setting where the parties do not have access to any randomness resource at all. While this work showed that randomness cannot be completely eliminated, it simultaneously motivated several natural questions studying the "extent" to which randomness is necessary. A rich line of work deals with studying the usage of imperfect randomness in various settings (see [16] , [11] and the references therein). Another line of work (and the one dealt with in this paper) studies whether all the random choices can be made "offline" and be fixed once and for all. In other words, is it possible to design cryptographic protocols where a party can reuse the same random tape in multiple (or even all) executions.
The question of reusing randomness in cryptographic protocols was first considered in the context of zero knowledge by Canetti, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali [7] who proposed the notion of resettable zero knowledge. In resettable zero knowledge, the zero knowledge property is required to hold even if a malicious verifier can "reset" the prover to the initial state and start a new interaction where the prover uses the same random tape. Canetti et al. [7] proposed constructions of resettable zero knowledge protocols based on standard cryptographic assumptions. Barak, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Lindell [4] showed how to construct zero knowledge protocols for opposite setting (where soundness is required to hold even if the verifier uses the same random tape in multiple executions), which following Micali and Reyzin [18] 1 they call resettably sound (rS) zero-knowledge. To summarize, there now exist zero knowledge protocols which allow one of the parties to reuse the same randomness while the other would be required to use fresh randomness in every execution. This leads to the following natural question (called the simultaneous resettability problem in [4] ):
"Do there exist zero knowledge protocols which allow both parties to re-use their (respective) random tape in every execution?"
Since the works of [7] , [4] , many questions about the security of resettable protocols have been addressed (see the subsection on related work). However, the above question of simultaneous resettability has remained open despite years of work.
Our Results.: In this work, we settle this question in the positive by constructing the first simultaneous-resettable zero-knowledge protocol. The primary road block to answering this question had been a limitation in our understanding of non-black-box simulation strategies [1] , which are essential in this context (see below) and have been important in achieving a number of advanced cryptographic goals (e.g. [1] , [2] , [19] , [21] , [6] ). To get our result, we develop novel non-black-box simulation strategies that allow for efficient incorporation of recursive rewinding techniques [24] , [17] , [23] , which we believe to be of independent interest and of potentially wider applicability. Following is the main theorem of the paper (informal version).
Theorem 1: Assume that trapdoor permutations and collision-resistant hash function families exist. Then there exists a resettably sound resettable zero-knowledge argument system for an NP-complete language.
Discussion
Resettable zero knowledge.: Resettable zero knowledge, where the prover may be reset, is closely related to concurrent zero knowledge (cZK) [12] , where the prover can be forced to interact in an unbounded number of concurrent executions of the protocol, with the interleaving at the control of the attacking verifier. Indeed, resettable zero-knowledge is a strictly stronger requirement than concurrent zero-knowledge; every resettable zero-knowledge protocol is also a concurrent zero-knowledge protocol, but many concurrent zero-knowledge protocols are not resettable zero-knowledge. Nevertheless, all known resettable zeroknowledge protocols (in the plain model) build upon concurrent zero-knowledge protocols [7] (see also [4] ).
All known concurrent zero-knowledge protocols make use of recursive rewinding techniques for simulation [24] , [17] , [23] . Since their introduction by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [14] , most zero-knowledge protocols have made use of rewinding -where the simulator "tries" to simulate the execution of the protocol, but sometimes "gets stuck", and in order to proceed, it rewinds the execution of the protocol to an earlier point, and tries again to "solve" the simulation (or tries to extract some information from the verifier that it needs to solve the simulation). In the setting of concurrent zero-knowledge, an additional problem arises: when the simulator rewinds the execution and tries again, the cheating verifier may schedule a new concurrent execution of the protocol -and this new execution of the protocol will itself need to be rewound in order to be solved. This leads to recursive rewinding strategies (with multiple "levels" of rewinding), and great care must be taken to prevent this recursion from leading to exponential-time simulations. When concurrent zero-knowledge protocols are modified to become resettable zero-knowledge, this recursive rewinding is inherited by the rZK simulators.
Resettable Soundness.: Resettably sound zero knowledge, where the verifier may be reset by a cheating prover (who is trying to prove a false statement), presents a different kind of challenge. Indeed, if a zero-knowledge protocol is simulated by means of a rewinding strategy, then it seems that a cheating prover who can reset the verifier can implement the same strategy as the simulator (since rewinding is nothing more than resetting a party to an earlier state). This intuition is formalized by Barak et al. [4] , who show that no resettably-sound zero-knowledge arguments exist for languages outside BPP if the simulator is black-box. Thus, non-black-box simulation, as pioneered by Barak [1] , is essential to building resettably sound zero-knowledge protocols. In non-black-box simulation, the actual code of the cheating verifier is used in order to simulate the protocol; this is something that is not available to a cheating prover who can only reset the verifier. Barak et al. [4] show how to use such non-black-box zero-knowledge protocols to achieve resettably sound zero-knowledge arguments.
Techniques
The central idea behind our result concerns a novel non-black-box simulation strategy. We first describe this simulation strategy in isolation and then discuss how it is useful in our context.
The New Non-black-box Simulation Strategy.: To understand the simulation strategy, we first look at the nonblack-box zero knowledge protocol of Barak [1] . The core idea behind Barak's protocol is to have the prover commit in advance to a program that claims to predict (using an input of "small length") a string that is later randomly chosen by the verifier. The prover then must prove that either its committed program really can predict the verifier's string, or that the statement is true. In a real execution, the program is information theoretically extremely unlikely to be able to predict the verifier's random string no matter what the input string is. This is because the input string is not large enough to contain sufficient information about the verifier's random string. But in simulation (in the stand-alone setting), where the simulator can choose the verifier's random coins in advance and commit to these coins along with the verifier's code, the simulator can ensure that the program mimics the verifier's execution of the protocol and therefore correctly predict the verifier's string.
However, (for example) in the fully concurrent setting, there might be messages of several other sessions in between the two "key messages" (that is, the commitment from the prover and the random string from the verifier). Thus, the program that the simulator commits to must regenerate the transcript of the interaction of all the concurrent executions up until the point that the adversary in the current execution outputs his randomly chosen string. The simulation technique described above does not work in such a scenario and most natural approaches to try to extend it either lead to exponential time simulation or require the input string to the program to be too long (which in turn causes the soundness to fail).
Let us now consider what extra power can we provide to such a program without compromising on soundness: 1) We start with the observation that even if we allow the program to run in exponential time, the soundness of the protocol is still preserved. This is because even an exponential time program can't predict (output) a random value chosen after the program is fixed. Of course, this observation does not appear to lead to a useful simulation strategy because the running time of the simulator would be exponential. 2) Because of that, we instead consider polynomial time programs which however have access to an outside oracle. During execution, the program can query the oracle and get a response as many times as it wants. However, the key constraint is that there should only exist one valid response to a query. Definition of a valid response is fixed as part of the protocol specification. Further, given a response (and the corresponding query), it should be possible to determine in polynomial time if the response is valid. An example of such a system is when the program queries the oracle with f (s) and expects s in return (where f is a one-way permutation). In other words, the query string fixes the response string in an information theoretic sense. Therefore, the program will only output one fixed value no matter how the oracle is implemented. This preserves the soundness of the protocol. 3) We now address the question of how the simulator implements the oracle. The simulator initially commits to a program which, during execution, might require responses to queries of a given format. The protocol execution continues and reaches the point when the simulator has to prove that the committed program can predict the verifier's challenge string. At this point, the simulator can anticipate the queries which this program would make (since the program was created by the simulator). Our protocol/simulation strategy will ensure that the simulator already has the responses to each of these queries by this point (possibly by additional means such as rewinding). Thus, the simulator's oracle simply consists of a polynomial number of query, response pairs. 4) To sum up, the simulator proves that there exists a string such that: (A) the committed program makes queries the responses to which can be found in the string, (B) all the query-response pairs satisfy the required format, and, (C) the committed program outputs the verifier's random string.
Here is another way of looking at the above idea. We allow the simulator to supply its program an input of any length. However, the program is only allowed to access this input in a controlled manner so as to not violate the soundness of the protocol. Looking ahead, during simulation of our simultaneous resettable zero knowledge protocol, the program committed by the simulator would make queries consisting of a commitment (to some string) while the response would consist of the opening to the commitment. Assuming that the commitment scheme is one-to-one, there can only be one valid answer to any query. As mentioned earlier, our simulator would make use of rewinding techniques as well. The rewinding precisely accomplishes the goal of extracting from the verifier the opening to a commitment which can then be used in implementing the oracle later.
Using the above in Our Context.: We will first discuss the simpler goal of building a resettably-sound concurrent zero-knowldge argument 2 . We begin by briefly recalling how all known concurrent zero-knowledge protocols work in the plain model, for proving "x ∈ L" where L is an NPcomplete language [24] , [17] , [23] , at an informal level. The high level idea is this: First the verifier commits to a "secret". Then, the prover and verifier do the following many times sequentially (over many rounds of interaction): the prover makes a "challenge" to which the verifier responds, with the properties that: (1) a single challenge-response from each round reveals no information about the secret or the randomness used to commit to the secret, but (2) any two distinct challenge-response pairs from the same round reveal the secret and the randomness used to commit to the secret 3 . Then, the prover proves the following using an ordinary zero-knowledge (or WI) proof: that either the prover knows the verifier's secret, or that x ∈ L. This works because in real life, the prover only gets one response for each round, and therefore he cannot learn the verifier's secret. However, in a simulation, the simulator can "rewind" the verifier and try to get two challenge-response pairs for some round, and thereby learn the verifier's secret (and the randomness the verifier used to commit to his secret). As discussed earlier, the concurrent setting requires such a simulation to use a recursive rewinding strategy, in order to successfully "solve" every execution of the protocol as they arise.
As discussed earlier, such concurrent zero-knowledge protocols are certainly not resettably sound, since if a cheating prover could reset the verifier, it could use the same rewinding strategy to discover the verifier's secret and use it to cheat (just like the concurrent zero-knowledge simulator does). A simple idea to fix this problem is the following:
Have the prover commit to all his challenges in advance, and then in the challenge-response phase, have the prover give a resettably-sound zero-knowledge argument that his challenges are the same as the ones that he committed to earlier. Now, the cheating prover can't cheat even if he can reset the verifier. But there seems to be a problem here: thinking back to the concurrent zero-knowledge simulator, in order to extract the verifiers' secrets, it needs to give different challenges from the ones it commits to, so it will need to simulate the resettably-sound zero-knowledge argument so that it can lie. Such a non-black-box simulation would make use of the ideas described earlier. Recall that by the property of the overall recursive rewinding strategy, when the simulator actually needs to prove that its program can predict the verifier's string, the simulator will have already extracted the verifiers' secrets (and randomness used to commit to those secrets) for all the verifiers that have appeared in any concurrent executions between when we committed to the program and the time when we need to complete the proof. Therefore, the simulator already knows the secrets and randomness corresponding to all the commitment-breaking oracle queries that our program will ever make.
To reach from one point to the other in a thread of interaction, a rewinding simulator potentially goes through many other threads (in our case, to extract the opening to a commitment). Our non-black-box simulation idea ensures that the program committed to by the simulator does not have to repeat through all the threads to reach the verifier's challenge string. This is because the information extracted by the simulator in all "other" threads is already available to the program through oracle queries. This helps keep our simulation polynomial time.
To make this approach work, aside from the main idea above, we also make use of several other (new and old) ideas, including a new recursive rewinding technique inspired by [24] . At its core, our new non-black-box simulation strategy allows for protocols that make essential use of non-black-box simulation but that can also benefit from information learned using black-box recursive-rewinding simulation methods. Given that previous non-black-box simulation advances have had an impact on numerous advanced cryptographic research goals (e.g. [1] , [2] , [19] , [21] , [6] ), we believe that our new strategy will have other applications as well.
Related Work
Subsequent to the works of Canetti et al. [7] and Barak et al. [4] described above, a number of works have investigated the problem of security against resetting attacks for zeroknowledge protocols in the plain model. Barak, Lindell, and Vadhan [5] constructed the first constant-round publiccoin argument that is resettable zero-knowledge. Deng and Lin [9] showed a zero-knowledge argument system that is bounded resettable zero-knowledge and satisfies a weak form of resettable soundness; we make use of some ideas from [5] , [9] in this work.
A larger body of work has investigated the same problems in a relaxed setting, called the "bare public key" (BPK) model, introduced by [7] , which assumes that parties must register (arbitrarily chosen) public keys prior to any attack taking place. We stress that our results hold in the plain model, not just in the BPK model, and the kinds of techniques used in the BPK model typically do not apply to the plain model. See the full version for an outline of the known results in the BPK model [15] .
OUR MAIN CONSTRUCTION
We describe our main protocol in this section. The presented protocol is slightly weaker than a resettably sound resettable zero-knowledge protocol. First, this protocol satisfies the property of a "relaxed" concurrent zero-knowledge where the adversarial verifier fixes its random tape for a session before the session begins and then plays honestly in that session using that random tape. It might however use any malicious strategy to determine this random tape as well as interleave sessions in any arbitrary way (see the full version [15] for a formal definition). Secondly, the protocol satisfies the property of hybrid soundness (a property slightly weaker than resettable soundness, see [7] , [4] ). In the full version [15] , we describe transformations using which given any resettably sound relaxed concurrent zero knowledge argument, a resettably sound resettable zero knowledge argument system can be obtained.
Let Com(s) denote a commitment to a string s using a non-interactive perfectly binding commitment scheme Com with unique opening (see the full version). Whenever we need to be explicit about the randomness, we denote by Com(s; r) a commitment to a string s computed with randomness r.
The common input to P and V is x supposedly in the language L ∈ N P , and a security parameter n. The auxiliary input to P is an N P -witness w for x ∈ L. Our protocol proceeds as follows.
1) The prover P generates a set of 2n 2 random challenge strings {ch 1 , . . . , ch 2n 2 } where for all i, ch i ∈ {0, 1} n . P computes and sends commitments {Com(ch 1 ), . . . , Com(ch 2n 2 )} to the verifier V .
2) The verifier V sets a trapdoor string trap = Com(1), generates a first verifier message σ of a rZAP system (see full version) and sends trap and σ to P . In addition, V computes the first message of the three round Blum Hamiltonian cycle protocol repeated in parallel 2n 3 times for the statement: "trap is a commitment to 1". In more detail, for every repetition, V generates a random permutation of the graph representing the above statement and sends to P the commitments to Common Input to P and V : x supposedly in the language L ∈ N P Auxiliary input to P : An N P -witness w for x ∈ L Protocol: The zero knowledge argument proceeds as follows:
1) The verifier V chooses a random collision resistant hash function h from a function family H and sends it to P . 2) The prover P computes z = Com(h(0)) and sends it to V .
3) The verifiers V selects a string r $ ← {0, 1} n 4 and sends it to P . 4) The prover P and the verifier V now execute a witness indistinguishable constant round public coin universal argument [3] where P proves to V that either x ∈ L or the transcript of this zero knowledge argument τ (= (h, z, r)) is in a language Λ defined below. We require the communication complexity of this universal argument to be O(n 2 ).
The language Λ is defined as follows. We say that (h, z, r) ∈ Λ if there exists an oracle program Π s.t. z = Com(h(Π)) and there exist strings y 1 ∈ {0, 1} 
∈ Λ. The above basic argument system is constant round as well as public coin. Applying the BGGL transformation [4] , we obtain a new argument system (which is resettably sound if the above basic argument system is standalone sound). 
3) For i ∈ [2n
2 ], the protocol proceeds as follows:
• the prover P sends the challenge string ch i (∈ {0, 1} n ) to V .
• P now proves to V that either: (a) ch i is the right challenge string committed in the i th commitment in step 2, or, (b) x ∈ L. This is done using our non black-box zero-knowledge argument compiled with the BGGL transformation as described in Figure 1 (having a novel trapdoor property to be used by the simulator).
• The verifier V now responds to the challenge ch i .
Let ch i [j] denote the j th bit of the challenge ch i . For all j, V sends the appropriate commitment openings (as per the Blum Hamiltonian cycle protocol) for the (ni + j) th parallel repetition assuming the challenge bit to be ch i [j].
4) The prover P finally gives a rZAP to V proving either x ∈ L or the string trap is a commitment to 1 under the commitment scheme Com.
PROOF OF RELAXED CONCURRENT ZERO KNOWLEDGE

Overview of Sim
We first informally describe the high-level structure of Sim highlighting the key issues (a more complete description will be given later on).
1) Sim generates the challenge strings in the first step randomly as described in the protocol and receives the reply from V * (which contains the string trap). 2) Sim and V * now execute the challenge response rounds (Step 3). In these rounds, the goal of Sim will be to rewind V * (in the fully concurrent setting) and extract the "trapdoor witness" which V * is using. Recall that there are 2n 2 "slots". In each slot, the prover gives a challenge (along with a non black-box zero-knowledge argument of its correctness) and the verifier opens the appropriate commitments. Sim will attempt to rewind V * in the concurrent setting and, in some slot, get its response for two different challenges. Indeed, rewinding strategies now exist which can achieve the above extraction goal even with ω(logn) slots (see [23] ). However, the main non-triviality in our setting is that the prover is committed to its challenge in each slot ahead of time (this property will be crucial for achieving resettable soundness). Thus, in the look ahead threads, to give a challenge different from the one committed to in a slot, Sim will need to simulate the associated non black-box zeroknowledge argument in the fully concurrent setting (with no apriori bound on the number of executions). Our approach to solve this problem is as follows:
• We first design a new rewinding strategy for Sim where every thread has the property that the simulator gives a randomly generated challenge (as opposed to the one committed to) to the verifier in at most a constant number of slots across all sessions. In all other slots, the simulator can continue to play honestly giving the challenge it committed to earlier. We stress none of the rewinding strategies in the previous works had this property.
• We then describe our novel non black-box simulation strategy using which the simulator can prove a false theorem in a constant number (across all sessions) of non black-box zero-knowledge arguments in every thread (in the fully concurrent setting). This allows our simulator to give a random challenge in a constant number of slots in every thread as required by our rewinding strategy. Our non black box simulation strategy can potentially be extended to simulate any apriori bounded number of slots in each thread, however, this is not required by our rewinding strategy. We describe our rewinding and non black-box simulation strategies in detail in the following subsections.
3) Sim and V * now execute the final rZAP. By this point, Sim has already extracted a witness to the statement "trap is a commitment to 1" from the verifier. Hence, Sim uses this witness to execute this rZAP.
The Simulator Sim
Before going into the details of Sim, we first fix some terminology. We assume there are a total of m sessions (each session having 2n 2 slots). The beginning of a slot is when the simulator gives the challenge, the end of the slot being when it receives the response. In between these two messages, apart from the non black-box zero knowledge argument associated with the challenge, there might be messages of other sessions. In any thread, we say a slot is being simulated if the simulator is giving a random challenge (as opposed to the one committed to) in that slot and is simulating the associated non black-box zero knowledge argument. Otherwise, if the challenge is being given honestly as committed to, we say that the slot is being honestly executed. We say that a session is being simulated if any slot in it is being simulated, otherwise we say the session is being honestly executed.
As with the strategy in [24] (and [22] ), our rewinding schedule is "adaptive". In [24] , at a very high level, whenever a slot s completes, the simulator may rewind s by calling itself recursively on s. That is, the simulator chooses another challenge for s and recursively executes until either it receives the response (and hence "solves" the session) or it observes that the verifier has started "too many" new sessions or has aborted. One case of special interest to us is when the simulator gets "stuck" on another unsolved session that started earlier than s. The simulator restarts rewinding s in such a case. Richardson and Kilian [24] observe that such a case can happen at most m−1 times. This is because while the simulator is trying to rewind s, once it gets stuck on a session that started earlier, it will never get stuck on that session again. Such an analysis is problematic in our scenario where we can simulate only a constant (or a bounded) number of sessions (and hence in our scenario the challenges chosen for a slot in two different threads are not necessarily independent).
The key idea of our simulation technique is to completely avoid the scenario of simulator getting stuck on a session which started earlier. Whenever our simulator decides to rewind a slot s, it chooses a random challenge and recursively invokes itself by giving that random challenge in s (and simulating the associated non black-box zero knowledge argument). Going forward, challenges for all other slots are given honestly by default. In addition, as opposed to strategies in [24] , [22] where the simulator only rewinds slots of sessions that started at the current recursive level, our simulator is always "on the lookout" for opportunities to rewind and solve a session. More precisely, before the simulator reaches the final rZAP for a session (and hence potentially gets stuck on it), our choice of the number of slots guarantees that there would exist at least one recursive level which will have at least 2n slots of that session. Whenever the simulator observes 2n slots in one level, it would rewind those 2n slots and solve that session with high probability. This idea ensures that the simulator never gets stuck on a session that started earlier than the target slot s.
The formal description of our simulator is given below. We borrow some notation from [22] .
2 ) will denote the maximum depth of recursion. Note that d is a constant since the number of sessions m is polynomial in the security parameter n. Our simulator will have the property that the total number of slots being simulated in any thread is bounded by d.
• slot(i, j) will denote slot j of session i.
• denotes the current depth of the recursion.
SOLVE(x, , h initial , s, L):
Let h ← h initial Repeat forever and update h after each step: 1) If the verifier aborts or the number of slots in h started after h initial (which we will call new slots) exceed
2) If the next message is the first prover message of some session, generate and commit random challenges honestly. 3) If the next message is the first verifier message of some session, continue; 4) If the next message is the final rZAP of some session then, as explained in step 6(c), we have already solved that session (else the simulator would have aborted by this point). In other words, that trapdoor witness for that session has been extracted. Use the extracted trapdoor witness (for the statement "trap is a commitment to 1") to execute the final rZAP. 5) If the next message is a prover message for the beginning of a slot s , we have the following two possibilities: a) If s ∈ L, the slot s is being simulated. The simulator uses the challenge specified in L. In addition, the simulator uses our non black-box simulator subroutine (described in the next subsection) to handle all the messages of the non black-box zero-knowledge argument associated with this message. b) If s / ∈ L, the simulator proceeds honestly to give the challenge. It also executes the associated non black-box zero-knowledge argument honestly. solved or the number of new slots (including s ) of session i in h started after h initial is less than 2n, the simulator need not rewind this slot. Continue; c) Otherwise, we have an unsolved session i such that 2n of its slots (from slot(i , j − 2n + 1) to slot(i , j )) have appeared at the current level. The Sim will rewind each of these slots n times and will solve session i except with negligible probability. Observe that the depth d of the recursion is a constant and the total number of slots in a session is 2n 2 . This means just by the pigeonhole principle, for every session i , we would have this case at some level before we reach its final rZAP. For each slot s" in this list of 2n slots, repeat n times:
Add s" to L". In addition, select a random challenge for s" and add it to L". ii) Let h" be the prefix of h which contains all messages up to but excluding the prover challenge for s". Set h * ← SOLVE(x, + 1, h", s", L"). iii) If h * contains an accepting execution for slot s", the simulator has succeeded in solving s" and hence session i . If after repeating this step n times for each such slot s", we have not yet solved session i , abort and output Ext Fail. Sim(x, z):
Run SOLVE(x, 0, ⊥, ⊥, ⊥) and output the view returned by SOLVE, with the following exception. When the simulator generates random challenge for a simulated slot and it becomes equal to the real challenge for that slot or another simulated challenge generated previously in a different thread for the same slot, the simulator aborts and outputs ⊥.
Looking ahead, the core of the analysis of this rewinding strategy can be found in the full version [15] where we prove that the probability with which the simulator outputs Ext Fail is negligible in n.
The Non Black-Box Simulation Subroutine
Recall that in a thread, whenever the simulator simulates a slot to give a random challenge, it was required to simulate the associated non black-box zero-knowledge argument. We describe our non black-box simulator subroutine in this subsection, and prove the completeness of the simulator's use of this subroutine to execute the non-black-box argument system.
First we remark on the random tape used by the simulator. The simulator has a random tape R A which is sufficiently long so that it can be utilized to compute all messages of all threads except messages of a slot being simulated (We discuss more about this exception later). In more detail, consider the "execution tree" of the simulation where each function call to SOLVE represents one node in the tree while each recursive call made by it represents one of its child nodes (see the full version [15] for more details on how this execution tree is defined). The random tape R A has a (sufficiently long) portion for each such possible node in the execution tree. As shown in the full version, this execution tree has depth upto d and degree upto 2mn 2 (and hence only has a polynomial number of nodes). From this it follows that the length of R A is only polynomial (since each execution of SOLVE can only utilize a polynomial amount of randomness). Note that a node in the tree at depth can be uniquely identified by a tuple (S 1 , . . . , S ) where
. Hence, such a sequence also uniquely identifies the portion of the random tape R A to be used for the execution of that node. We map each execution of SOLVE during a simulation to a node in the execution tree in the natural way by mapping the first call SOLVE(x, 0, ⊥, ⊥, ⊥) to the root node and mapping the i-th recursive call made by an execution of SOLVE to its i-th child node. This determines the randomness our simulator will use to complete that execution of SOLVE.
The simulator also has a "separate" random tape R B which it uses to execute the slots which are being simulated. In other words, the random tape of the simulator can be partitioned into two parts. The first part R A is used (in all sessions of all threads) to execute non black box zero knowledge arguments which are being honestly executed and to execute everything else in the protocol except simulated slots (i.e, the prover first message, final rZAP etc.). The second part of the random tape is exclusively used (in all threads) for picking random challenges in the slots being simulated and for executing non black box zero knowledge arguments which are being simulated (Such a separation of random tape is essential for our hybrid arguments to go through).
Denote the thread containing the slot to be simulated by T . The simulator sends a random challenge in this slot and uses the trapdoor condition of the associated non black-box zero knowledge argument to proceed. As the first step of the proof, the verifier sends a hash function h as usual. The simulator now constructs a program Π and sends z = Com(h(Π)). The program Π, very roughly, is constructed using part of the current state of the simulator and the adversarial verifier such that it is able to go forward and produce their upcoming interaction transcript in the thread T (with some input and "help from outside"). Details of what Π does will be clear as we go forward. After receiving the commitment from the simulator, the adversarial verifier may continue interaction in other concurrent sessions and finally produces a string r. The simulator now executes the universal argument with the verifier as follows. It first prepares a string y 1 containing the following:
1) The slot identifiers (in the form of tuples (i, j) containing the session and the slot numbers) for all the simulated slots in the thread T . 2) The randomly selected challenges for all the above slots. 3) For each slot above, a tuple uniquely identifying the corresponding node of the execution tree (note that each simulated slot can be mapped to an execution of SOLVE). 4) All prover messages which: (a) belong to a non black box zero knowledge argument being simulated, and, (b) lie between messages z and r in the thread T . This includes the message z. 5) The number of simulator-verifier steps of interaction in T between messages z and r.
Recall that the number of simulated slots in T is bounded by a constant d(= log n (m · 2n
2 ) ). Furthermore, the size of each prover message included in y 1 is O(n 2 ). From this, it can be shown that |y 1 | ≤ n 3 .
The simulator additionally constructs a string y 2 as follows. Consider a session for which the final rZAP lies between messages z and r. Since the simulator executed the thread T without aborting till at least the message r, it follows that it must have extracted the trapdoor witness, i.e., a witness to the statement "trap is a commitment to 1" (by getting a response for two different challenges in a slot across different threads) for that session. In other words if the trapdoor string for that session is trap, the simulator has obtained (s, r) with trap = Com(s; r). The string y 2 simply contains such commitment strings trap and their opening tuples (s, r). Now we discuss the functionality of Π in detail.
The program Π is constructed using two components: (a) the current state of the verifier, and, (b) part of the current state of the simulator which has the first part of the simulator random tape R A . The portion of R A used by Π to regenerate various parts of the transcript of thread T can be determined using the tuples for each simulated slot given as part of y 1 . This means that Π is able to compute the outgoing prover messages except if it is a message belonging to a slot being simulated. However then, the input y 1 contains all messages belonging to such simulated slots. Thus, the program Π regenerates the transcript of thread T from z to r (z, r inclusive) as follows. It takes y 1 as input and runs the inbuilt simulator and verifier machines from message z onwards (using their states at the point just before message z is sent). Whenever Π needs to compute a prover message for a slot s (i.e., the challenge or a prover message of the associated non black-box zero knowledge argument), it checks y 1 to see if s is simulated. If so, Π uses the message specified in y 1 . Otherwise, Π computes the message honestly using the right portion of R A . The program Π however does not execute any other threads apart from T . This is crucial for the running time of our simulator to be polynomial. This means that the inbuilt simulator may not have the required trapdoor when it has to execute the final rZAP of a session. The oracle calls allowed to Π come to the rescue here. For such a session, let the description of its trapdoor string be denoted by trap. The program Π makes an oracle call with the string trap. This string trap and its opening (s, r) with trap = Com(s; r) is guaranteed to be found in y 2 by construction. Hence, Π can obtain the required witness for the statement "trap is a commitment to 1" and use that to complete the final rZAP. The program Π runs for the number of steps specified in the input y 1 , regenerates the transcript in T between z and r and halts outputting r (in the full version, we show that the number of steps is bounded by n log log n as required). To conclude, the opening to the commitment z and the pair (y 1 , y 2 ) constitute a witness to the statement (h, z, r) ∈ Λ. The simulator uses this witness to execute the universal argument and hence complete the non blackbox zero-knowledge argument, as long as y 2 contains all the necessary (s, r) pairs, which must be the case unless the simulator has already failed and output Ext Fail.
The detailed security analysis of the above protocol can be found in the full version [15] .
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The Construction. Another approach was presented in [8] . The construction of [8] makes crucial use of a tool called instance-dependent resettably-sound resettable WI argument of knowledge (IDWIAOK, introduced by Deng and Lin in [10] ). Roughly speaking, for a NP statement of the form x 0 ∨ x 1 , IDWIAOK is an argument for which resettable WI property holds when both x 0 and x 1 are YES instances, and resettably-sound argument of knowledge property holds when x 0 is a NO instance.
IDWIAOK can be obtained by applying the transformation of [10] , [8] to the classic 3-round WI argument of knowledge. Let (a, e, z) be the three messages exchanged in an execution of this argument. Roughly, given x 0 ∈ L 0 ∨ x 1 ∈ L 1 as the common input, the transformation consists of the following steps 1) P first sends a commitments c a , c 0 to two randomly chosen pseudorandom functions respectively; 2) V sends a commitment to a challenge e; 3) P produces the first message a of the underlying 3-round WI argument using randomness generated by applying the pseudorandom function committed in c a to the current history and uses a ZAP to prove that x 0 ∈ L 0 or a is computed correctly; 4) V sends e and executes the following variant of PassRosen's public-coin ZK protocol [20] (a perfect ZK version of Barak's protocol) to give a correctness proof for e: in each verifier's step, the prover (which plays the role of verifier in this subprotocol) generates a verifier's message of Pass-Rosen protocol by applies the pseudorandom function committed in c 0 to current history, and uses a ZAP to prove that x 0 ∈ L 0 or this message is computed correctly; 5) P sends z. According to terminology of [10] , the instance x 0 and the commitment to a pseudorandom function form the so-called instance-dependent verifiable pseudorandom function, and the subprotocol used to prove the correctness of e was called key instance-dependent (depending on x 0 ) resettably-sound class-bounded resettable zero knowledge argument.
The resettably-sound resettable ZK argument of [8] proceeds as follows. Let G be a pseudorandom generator and f be an one-way function. The prover first chooses a random string γ and proves that x ∈ L (the common input) or there exists δ such that γ = G(δ) via an IDWIAOK, then the verifier chooses a random string α, computes β = f (α), and repeats an special-purpose IDWIAOK (in which the prover gives the correctness proof for a challenge by proving an OR statement "x ∈ L or the challenge is correct") k times in sequential, in each iteration he proves that there exist δ such that γ = G(δ) or he knows a preimage of β; At the last stage, the prover proves that x ∈ L or he knows a preimage of β using an IDWIAOK again. Though this protocol seems quite different from the main protocol presented in this paper, the basic idea behind these protocols is very similar: We have the verifier obtain a NO instance (the γ and the trap commitment respectively) in the first stage, and then use it to prevent the verifier from resetting attack in the iteration stage.
The Non-Black-Box Simulation Strategy. The simulation strategy of [8] is also a mix of recursive rewinding black-box simulation strategy and straight-line non-blackbox simulation strategy, but with a different technique that allows us to embed the non-black-box simulation in the black-box simulation. We observe that this technique also applies to the black-box simulation strategy described in previous section as well. Due to space limitations, we just present the main idea of this technique in the concurrent setting here, and refer readers to [8] for detailed description.
Consider the black-box part of SOLVE. We embed the (slightly modified) Barak's non-black-box simulation strategy in the SOLVE in the following way: When the procedure SOLVE is invoked for solving a session at a slot s, we have a new (with independent randomness) Barak's non-black-box simulator Sim B for log n-bounded concurrent ZK protocol produce the prover messages belonging to this slot.
We view this mixed simulation as a tree, each node representing a joint execution of SOLVE and Sim B . Sim B at a node v performs as follows.
• At the first prover step in the proof of correctness for the challenge in slot s, Sim B commits to the hash value of the joint code Π of the whole subtree rooted at v except Sim B itself at v and the malicious verifier. Note that Π includes SOLVE at v and all codes (including the codes of Sim B ) at children nodes of v; • After the above prover step, Sim B acts as the same as Barak's simulator, and treats the messages output by Sim B at nodes in the path from the root to v (excluding v) as auxiliary string y (such that Π(z, y) = r, where z and r are the first prover message and second verifier message of Pass-Rosen protocol respectively). Note that the depth d of the entire tree is constant (hence the length of y is "short"), and thus at any node our non-black-box simulator Sim B for log n-bounded concurrent ZK protocol works. The most important feature of our strategy is that we invoke d non-black-box simulators Sim B in a single thread (a simulation path), each handling only one slot (though every one is capable of handling log n slots), but these non-blackbox simulators are not independent: In a thread, Sim B at higher level (i.e., at node closer to root) uses those codes of Sim B at lower level when computing its first prover message. Note that the Sim B at node v is able to treat messages produced by all other Sim B (rather than only those at higher level)in the same thread as auxiliary string due to the constant depth of the recursion, and if we need only to simulate a single thread, it does not need to use those codes of Sim B at lower level in its execution. However, the real situation is much more complex: the procedure Sim B at node v may go through the entire subtree rooted at v, which may include too many simulated slots. This is why we have Π include the entire subtree.
The running time analysis of this non-black-box strategy is a bit more involved. We observe that Independency at the same level: at the same level, all these Sim B 's are independent of each other in the sense that they use independent randomness and do not use each others code in their executions.
This independence property guarantees that the running time of Sim B at node v at level t is (essentially) related only to those Sim B 's at lower level t (< t)in the subtree rooted at v, and it enables us to prove Sim B at at node (and hence SOLVE) runs in polynomial time by induction on the level of recursion.
